Abu Mazen, the Policy of Betting on Rationality by Hazem Saghiyeh

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On the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Abu Mazen, the Policy of Betting on Rationality

by Hazem Saghiyeh

01 January 2000

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It is difficult to recall any images of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen) in
military uniform, or surrounded by any of the symbols and rituals that
usually surround military officials and leaders of freedom movements. The
man who ranked seventh among the Fatah historical leadership, and they are
plentiful, can only be recalled as an ordinary person you could meet on a
street or in an elevator. To those watching him, the 'message' he emanates
is a very civil one, entwined with domestic features familiar in a father
or uncle. He presents himself without artificial symbols, compared to
fighters wearing fatigues or green military uniforms and long beards,
creating for themselves a charisma that quite often turns out to be a
non-charisma, in the opposite direction, as in the case with Yasser Arafat
in particular. But Abu Mazen, much to his misfortune, does not only
contradict freedom fighters, but also the military mentality that now
dominates the leadership in Israel. Such mentality is reflected by General
Ariel Sharon who, well-shaven and in military uniform, has been behind more
than a bloody and brutal incident, and who is presently building a wall
that will swallow half the area of the West Bank.

The Palestinian Prime Minister has moved too far away from struggle
rituals, and exhibited an 'open mindedness' that is censured by struggle
movements, as well as national armies which prefer fervor to reason. For by
fervor alone is mobilization achieved and the imagination militarized.
This, indeed, weakens a leader's charisma, whatever shape it has,
especially because a struggle requires a certain level of charisma that
exceeds what is required by rational policies. When achievement is lacking,
compensation should come in the form of lies and inflated promises that
keep a leader in his position. Abu-Mazen, the reticent leader with no
promises, is not the right man for a job like this one.

The man's dilemma is compounded by the tragedy of his people, who have been
subjected to collective punishment, accompanied by a mounting
impoverishment and a quasi-systematical confiscation of land. His dilemma
is further aggravated by the fact that the popular culture to which he
belongs is not known for its love of forms of non-violent action. And even
if it did wish to respond to Israeli violations with politics and
institutions, it has a very poor tradition behind it to fall back on.

In spite of all this, it looks like Abbas bartered rituals, symbols and
charisma for a simple life, void of mobilization, where the environment is
more appropriate for institutions and individuals to act. We should not
forget that the occupation and its resistance collaborated to neutralize
the roles of the Palestinian elites and qualified persons, who have been
sidetracked by violence and without whom no economic progress can take
place and no investments shall be made. Even if independence were achieved
in isolation from this role, it shall only be a transformation from a
compulsory misery into a voluntary misery, samples of which we have seen in
failed independent states. In this sense, the Abu-Mazen / Salaam Fayyad
partnership may be more important on the long-run than Abu-Mazen's present
inescapable de-facto partnership with Mohammad Dahlan. Indeed, the
Abu-Mazen politics finds support in a certain level of security, to
compensate for its present weakness, as well as in an American policy that
consists of pressure to make the "Road Map" a success. But it is also based
on betting on rationality. Rationality, in this case, starts functioning by
reading the experiences of the Palestinian national action. Doubtlessly,
Abu-Mazen has reviewed this violent experience whether outside, where it
led to two civil wars in Jordan and Lebanon, or inside, where the
difference between the two Intifadas is too vast to be ignored. The first
Intifada, the 'peaceful' one, contributed to opening the gate for politics
between Madrid and Oslo, and consequently to the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority. The second, which resulted partially from the halt
of Oslo process, or the shrinkage of politics, completed the closure of the
gate, and the destruction of the Authority.

One tends to believe that the Prime Minister eyes with some admiration and
envy the peace experiences of Anwar El Sadaat and King Hussein, and perhaps
believes that it may have been fit and proper for the party concerned; the
Palestinian, to establish this course. For Sadaat and Hussein did not only
bring their countries out of war, but also gained significant popularity
within the Israeli public opinion. Without indulging in self-deceit, and
taking into consideration military power balance and the limited support
that Arabs can provide to Palestinians, practically not orally, the Israeli
public opinion is capable of being the most powerful weapon for their
independence. For when the conflict is political, over what Abu-Mazen is
calling for, this public opinion will represent an ally against all Israeli
military's narrow-minded and nationalists, while this same public opinion
will turn, in the wake of suicide actions, into a sharp sword against
Palestinians.

Calculations like these, and not only religious and moral incentives, are
what instigated men like Ghandi and Martin Luther King to prefer
non-violence facing the massive power of the British forces in India, or
the veneration of the United States. They must have had the future in mind
when they calculated the power balance; for achieving Indian independence
through violence would have given birth to a totalitarian regime similar to
that in the neighboring China, while achieving civil rights by force would
have left an inheritance of hatred between blacks and whites, that would
have dwarfed the hatreds of the Civil War.

Betting on the mind is betting on the future especially as September 11th
has become a tremendous and unprecedented pressure. Perhaps, under the
pressure of limited alternatives, Abu-Mazen recalled from the past what may
help to move on into the future. He may have remembered, from his sojourn
in Lebanon, a wise statement made by a Lebanese politician, who was not as
wise in everything he had said: "The strength of Lebanon lies in its
weakness". Uttered by Pierre Jemayel, this statement makes a good title for
an approach that can be borrowed by militarily weaker factions, which can
contribute in other areas what may compensate for its military weakness. He
may have been exposed, during his stay in Tunis, to the "graduality" that
was connected to the name of the Tunisian independence establisher, Al
Habib Bourguiba. Indeed, the Palestinian experience itself, despite its
shortness and limited traditions, knew a politician like Ragheb
al-Nashashibi and his Defa'a party (National Defense Party), who proclaimed
this point of view at an early stage.

Will Abu Mazen succeed, in spite of everything, where others have failed?

# # #

Writer, commentator and columnist for the Arabic Newspaper al-Hayat in
London, Hazem Saghiyeh has authored books on Pan-Arabism and Political
Islam.

This commentary is one of a series of ten articles of views on
"Nonviolence" commissioned by the Common Ground News Service in partnership
with Al-Hayat newspaper and reprinted by other regional news and media
outlets. The article may be reproduced by any news or media outlet free of
charge. In case of publishing, please indicate: 'This article is part of a
series of views on "Nonviolence" distributed by the Common Ground News
Service (CGNews).'


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