Elements to a Mecca II Accord by Hanna Siniora

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Elements to a Mecca II Accord

by Hanna Siniora

12 July 2007

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JERUSALEM - It is clear that most of the Arab World, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the two most important economic and military Arab powers, want the two Palestinian movements Fatah and Hamas to repair damaged relations, resume talks for reconciliation and eventually arrive to a Mecca II agreement that would define clearly power sharing arrangements based on national priorities.

Saudi Arabia previously played such a role in rescuing Lebanon from the calamities of civil war. The war torn Lebanon was divided into political and confessional movements fighting for control. The Saudis hammered together the Taef Accords, which provided Lebanon with stability and power sharing that lasted up to the second Lebanon war with Israel in 2006. Saudi Arabia and the Arab League are again trying to update the Taef Accord to meet the challenges of recent regional developments.

In Palestine, the undermining of the Saudi brokered Mecca Accord needs fresh determined efforts by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to overcome recent ruptured relations between Fatah and Hamas, as a result of the military takeover of the Gaza Strip by the Hamas Executive Force and Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades. Mecca I helped form a short-lived National Unity Government, but did not resolve basic power sharing differences and in establishing the culture of shared political partnership.

All the leaders of the different PLO and Hamas factions recognize that the recent rupture has hurt the unity, image and national aspirations of the Palestinian people. After the terrible shock, cooler heads in Palestine and the Arab and Muslim World are demanding from both Fatah and Hamas to overcome the emotional outbursts and angry accusations that prevent the prospects of reaching independence and deliverance from the occupation. Egypt and Saudi Arabia quickly realized that their primary task is to heal the deep wounds within the Palestinian camp. Egypt, which angrily withdrew its military delegation in Gaza that was heavily involved in internal Palestinian reconciliation talks, decided that it should resume such a role. Saudi Arabia, after serious consultations carried by King Abdullah al-Saud with President Mubarak and King Abdallah of Jordan, indicated in very clear terms to President Abbas, the necessity to resume talks with Hamas. As a sign of displeasure, the Saudi King postponed a meeting with Abbas in Jordan while the former was in a state visit in Amman.

Even within the Fatah movement, the collapse in Gaza of the security forces loyal to Abbas is being assessed and evaluated. In Fatah, differences have surfaced and leaders from the Central Committee of Fatah, like Hani el-Hassan, have criticized the movement and in turn have been reprimanded and ostracized by other leaders of the movement. This healthy though acrimonious debate might lead to the early convening of the Sixth Fatah Convention to reorganize the movement, and inject new blood and carry out reforms that are urgent to restructure Fatah in order to be able to contest the next elections by removing leaders tarnished with corruption.

At this juncture, and in preparation for a Mecca II accord, which is inevitable, the following important facts and elements should be recognized and taken into consideration: the whole international community and most of the Arab and Islamic countries support and want to strengthen the democratically elected President Abbas as the legitimate voice of the people and the PA. Also President Abbas and his office should receive the backing of Hamas, as the party-in-charge of formal negotiations with the Israeli government.

PM Salam Fayyad, at the head of a group of independent technocrats, has succeeded in ending the boycott and sanctions that faced Hamas and the Unity Government. PM Fayyad, for the first time in 15 months, was able to pay a full salary to state employees, and is receiving again frozen revenues from Israel. Until reconciliation efforts succeed or early elections takes place, the Fayyad government, probably for the next two years, should stay in office to stabilize the economy, unite and reform the police and security forces and continue the reforms needed for good governance. This role, with the blessing of Fatah and Hamas, might allow Fayyad a second term after a Mecca II Accord, but for this crucial moment, it is essential to the Palestinian economy and to provide stability for the Fayyad cabinet to continue in office.

The Fayyad government should renegotiate the British Gas (BG) - CCC deal in order to create a 15-year special fund to reconstruct the Gaza Strip, at least $250 million a year is needed to make a dent, and jump-start the Gaza economy. Another urgent matter for Fayyad is to bring potable water to Gaza, in the next six months, from Turkey or through desalination. Such much-needed gestures toward the Palestinian population of Gaza will demonstrate beyond doubt, that Gaza is not neglected, and might help Hamas and Fatah reconcile to work for national goals together.

Hamas, too, should be part of the decision making. It is an important political movement that had been denied legitimacy. Certainly it has hurt its prospects by using force to control Gaza. Hamas has to emphasize its political and not military role; it has indicated it is willing to resume reconciliation talks with Fatah. In order to overcome the power struggle with Fatah, Hamas, for the duration of the present PLC (Parliament) should accept to exercise power sharing from the halls of the Parliament and not be part of the present executive structure. This period would end when new national elections take place after successful reconciliation talks. In the PLC, were Hamas has a majority, it can overrule actions that do not comply with Mecca II agreement guidelines. Hamas needs to send positive signals and messages to friends and foes, the release of Alan Johnston, the kidnapped BBC reporter, was good public relations for Hamas. With the return of the Egyptian delegation to Gaza, Hamas has to conclude as soon as possible a prisoner exchange with Israel, to close the case of the captive soldier Gilad Shalit.

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* Mr. Hanna Siniora is the Palestinian co-CEO of IPCRI - the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (www.ipcri.org). This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.

Source: The Jerusalem Times, 08 July 2007, www.jerusalem-times.net
Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.


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